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During the late 1960's and early 1970's, medical malpractice
insurers began to claim that, due to a complex of factors, chief
among them the rising number of claims for negligence and the
escalating dollar amounts of awards, the insurance companies
would no longer be able to provide coverage to doctors at a profit
without raising premiums drastically.1 Members of the insurance
and health care industries and legislators talked of tort reform.2 In
1975, individual insurers either announced huge rate increases for
doctors and hospitals or announced their withdrawal from the
medical malpractice insurance market. The "crisis" was on.3
At the federal and state levels of government, talk of legisla-
tion that would alter the means of compensating victims of medi-
cal malpractice began in earnest. Federal legislation was intro-
duced in 1975,1 but it was supplementary to that introduced by the
states,5 and Congress did not express an intent to preempt state
regulation of malpractice at that time.' Most of the states consid-
* A.B., 1973, University of California, Santa Cruz; M.F.A., 1975, University of Iowa;
member, third year class.
1. Charbonneau, Medical Malpractice Crisis: Fact or Fiction? 3 ORANGE COUNTY B.J.
139 (1976); Reder, Medical Malpractice: An Economist's View, A.B.F. RES. J. 511 (1976)
[hereinafter cited as Reder I]; Reder, An Economic Analysis of Medical Malpractice, 5 J.
LEGAL STUDIES 267 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Reder II]; W. CURRAN, How LAWYERS HAN-
DLE MEDICAL MALPRACTICE CASES: AN ANALYSIS OF AN IMPORTANT MEDICOLEGAL STUDY, HEW
Pub. No. (HRA) 76-3152, 33-35 (1976). See Aitken, Medical Malpractice: The Alleged "Cri-
sis" in Perspective, 3 W. ST. L. REv. 27 (1975); Blaut, Medical Malpractice Crisis-Its
Causes and Future, 44 INS. COUNSEL J. 114, 119-20 (1977)(explanation of the long tail prob-
lem); Sheehan, Medical Malpractice Crisis in Insurance: How It Happened and Some Pro-
posed Solutions, 11 FORUM 80-88 (1975).
2. Reder II, supra note 1, at 267.
3. W. CURRAN, supra note 1, at 34.
4. Studley & Nye, Federal Malpractice Bills, in HEALTH POLICY CENTER, GRADUATE
SCHOOL, GEORGETOWN UNIVERsITY, A LEGISLATOR'S GUIDE TO THE MEDICAL MALPRACTICE IS-
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ered or passed some medical malpractice legislation in 1975.1 A
common measure was the formation of joint underwriting associa-
tions that forced insurers to provide malpractice coverage and to
share losses.' More controversial were the revisions in licensing of
health care providers,9 creation of mandatory prescreening or arbi-
tration of claims, 10 shortening of statute of limitations periods,",
modification or elimination of the collateral source rule,12 limita-
tion of attorney contingency fees,' 3 provisions for periodic payment
of damages, 4 and limits on recovery of damages.'5
In 1976, challenges to this new legislation began to appear in
the courts. Most of the challenges have been based on Fourteenth
Amendment guarantees of equal protection and due process, 6 and
the results have varied considerably, depending upon choice of
standard by the reviewing court.I 7
This note begins with a discussion of the medical malpractice
insurance "crisis." The second section describes the American con-
cept of representation, which places a duty upon the judiciary to
intervene when the legislature fails to represent adequately a mi-
nority, and discusses the enforcement of equal protection guaran-
tees by the Supreme Court in recent years. The focus then shifts to
equal protection challenges in the state courts to some of the legis-
lation passed in response to the "crisis," and the standards used by
the reviewing courts. A discussion of status distinctions as a barrier
to suit in tort law and the trend toward elimination of some of
those barriers follows. The note concludes with the recommenda-
tion that the United States Supreme Court take advantage of the
next opportunity to grant certiorari to hear one of these cases, and
scrutinize the medical malpractice legislation and its purported ba-
sis, using a heightened standard of review.
For convenience I have focused in this note on a common pro-
7. Grossman, State-by-State Summary of Legislative Activities on Medical Malprac-
tice, in LEGISLATOR'S GUIDE, supra note 4, at 12-21.
8. Grossman, An Analysis of 1975 Legislation Relating to Medical Malpractice, in
LEGISLATOR'S GUIDE, supra note 4, at 4-6. Passed by 24 states as of 1976.
9. Id. at 7. Very few states significantly upgraded health care quality controls.
10. Id. at 8.
11. Id. at 9.
12. Id.
13. Id. at 10.
14. Grossman, supra note 7, at 12-21 (Alabama, California, Wisconsin).
15. Id. (California, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Louisiana, Ohio, Wisconsin).
16. White & McKenna, Constitutionality of Recent Malpractice Legislation, 13 Fo-
RUM 312 (1977).
17. Id. at 329.
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vision of medical malpractice legislation: the limit on recovery of
damages.
The Crisis
Is there, or was there, a crisis? The question is not frivolous.
One would expect that a legislature convened in extraordinary ses-
sion1s to consider comprehensive legislation's in response to the
crisis of organized medicine and the insurance companies-both
wealthy and powerful industries-that they were trapped by a
"crisis" would demand strong substantiation of that "crisis." One
would also expect that the legislature would not pass such legisla-
tion without obtaining that substantiation. But the passage of
AB1XX in California and the passage of similar legislation in other
states2° raises questions about the legislature's adherence to no-
tions of democracy and fairness,21 and raises questions generally
about the legislative process where, as one economist said: "events
can be exploited by an alert and well-organized pressure group to
manipulate legislative behavior.
22
Throughout the states, legislative activity regarding the "cri-
sis" was marked by a scarcity of reliable information about the
malpractice insurance underwriting system;23 confusion prevailed
as physicians and insurers demanded fundamental changes in the
tort liability system without providing the information necessary
to determine the need for such changes.24 Some took the same data
and used it to support opposite conclusions, 5 while others pleaded
for more information and better analysis.26
18. Keene, California's Medical Malpractice Crisis, in LEGISLATOR'S GUIDE, supra
note 4, at 31.
19. Id. at 33.
20. Grossman, supra note 8, at 3-11.
21. Although the struggle between rich and poor in America has not abated, see J.
MILLER, ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 497-505 (1943), the United States was
founded upon egalitarian ideals, and not upon the notion of government by the rich. In the
Declaration of Independence, "Jefferson gave his countrymen a new goal toward which to
strive: a republican system of government in which human rights would take precedence
over property and privilege." Id. at 493.
22. Reder I, supra note 1, at 512.
23. Aitken, supra note 1, at 34-36.
24. Czerwinski, Wisconsin's Medical Malpractice Crisis, in LEGISLATOR'S GUIDE, supra
note 4, at 55.
25. Compare California Assemblyman Keene's statements regarding the report of the
State Auditor General, Keene, supra note 18, at 32, with Charbonneau's statements regard-
ing the same report, Charbonneau, supra note 1, at 140.
26. Jones v. State Bd. of Medicine, 97 Idaho 859, 874-76, 555 P.2d 399, 414-16 (1976),
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A few voices raised objections to the legislatures' failure, under
the pressure of the medical and insurance industries, to discover
the facts. Participants in the 1975 hearings before the California
Assembly Select Committee on Medical Malpractice asked repeat-
edly for an analysis of the premium dollar,28 yet despite assurances
from the Chair and from various assemblymen that testimony re-
vealing this information was forthcoming,29 the figures were never
cert. denied, 431 U.S. 914 (1977); Reder I, supra note 1, at 512; Czerwinski, supra note 24,
at 55. See Transcript of Hearing, Assembly Select Committee On Medical Malpractice,
Feb. 18, 1975 and Feb. 21, 1975.
27. The Chairman of the Health Committee in the Wisconsin House of Representa-
tives said:
"I can't help but believe that the crisis in Wisconsin may have been artificially devel-
oped. The sudden momentum is highly suspect .... [W]e suddenly found ourselves faced
with a "deadline" imposed by the insurance industry and medical profession. We were pres-
sured to respond immediately under great pressure from all sides, including the many pa-
tients filled with anxiety by the public threats of the physicians to cease practice if the
Legislature didn't enact S.B.299 .... It appears that on a national basis the insurance in-
dustry was prepared to go the final mile in developing a crisis. Perhaps they were convinced
that if such a crisis could be created, legislators would respond by passing legislation which
would combine the liability limitations of a 'no-fault' system, and a requirement of proof of
fault with changed legal doctrines to make that proof more difficult with the result that
malpractice suits would be discouraged. It appears that in some states they succeeded."
Czerwinski, supra note 24, at 55.
28. See Transcript of Hearing, Feb. 18, 1975 and Feb. 21, 1975, supra note 26.
29. The following testimony illustrates:
"Mr. Werchick (a plaintiff's attorney): I certainly hope this committee will demand that
information [regarding the premium dollar] from the insurance carriers, because they've got
it.
"Assemblyman Keene: Certainly we will." Transcript of Hearing, Feb. 18, 1975, supra
note 26, at 100.
"Mr. Werchick: I submit ... that this committee has not yet, in its entire existence,
gotten a balance sheet, an income statement, a profit and loss statement, or a list of assets
from the insurance companies that are supposed to file these things with the State at least
on a triennial basis, but manage never to file complete information, in any case, to deter-
mine what the real cost of this system is. I have heard every speaker get up so far and say,
"Well somebody told me by the telephone last week that if we abolish the tort system they
can afford to provide coverage." Now where is the hard data so that we can see what this
system costs... ?
"Chairman Berman: We are going to have representatives of the industry here, and
that is one of the hardest things to find out, I agree with you on that." Id. at 110-11.
"Mr. Shore (a Doctor of Medicine and trial attorney): [A]ll day long I have been hear-
ing the shell game. Nobody has mentioned what is happening to all of the money. Where is
it going? ... There is certainly a great deal more ... money going into premiums than
there is going out in verdicts and in settlements in the State of California." Transcript of
Hearing, Feb. 21, 1975, supra note 26, at 134. ". . . [The crisis] is imposed upon the public
and the physician by some person who is not even telling us why it is a crisis, not giving us
the numbers. What happens to the interest on their reserves during the five-year period
while cases are pending before a resolution of a case? What happens to the interest on the
premium dollar that they don't ever refer to when we are talking about losses?
[Vol. 8:125
produced. When finally a representative of the Argonaut Insurance
Company appeared before the Committee, his testimony was eva-
sive,30 particularly when he was asked to provide figures.31
The Supreme Court of Idaho questioned the existence of a
malpractice insurance "crisis." The court refused to rule on equal
protection and due process questions raised by Idaho's malpractice
legislation until Idaho's Director of the Department of Insurance
presented the court with something more than the conflicting in-
formation contained in his affidavit and his conclusion that "the
Act was a 'response to the medical malpractice insurance cri-
sis'. .... -32 The court was "troubled" by the inference arising from
the Director's affidavit that "the 'crisis' in response to which the
subject Act was adopted results in part from economic fluctuations
and resultant unsuccessful investment practices. 3 3 The Director,
in defending Idaho's malpractice legislation, may have revealed in-
advertently what some assert is the true cause of the "crisis"-a
combination of greed, economic fluctuations and stock market
losses.31
In Nebraska, the one state where challenged medical malprac-
tice legislation has been upheld, the Director of Insurance had to
be sued before he would implement the law.3 5 He objected that the
Act was special legislation, that it denied an injured party due pro-
cess and equal protection, and that it denied the rights of access to
courts and trial by jury. 8
Whether or not there was a crisis,
[1]egislators soon found that under existing liability rules there
was no chance of finding premium rates acceptable to both doc-
"The Chairman: Very legitimate questions, in my opinion, and hopefully in the course
of all this, we can get some answers to those questions." Id. at 153-54.
30. See testimony of Lawrence C. Baker, id. at 156-74.
31. For example, three years after the Committee had been formed to study this prob-
lem, the representative of the insurance company was still promising the Assembly that "we
are still working on the figures, that we expect to have the figures to the medical society
probably on Monday. As far as other figures as to the company's overall results on medical
malpractice countrywide and California, that will be available when we file our annual state-
ment at the end of February." Id. at 171-72.
32. Jones v. State Bd. of Medicine, 97 Idaho 859, 872, 555 P.2d 399, 412 (1976), cert.
denied, 431 U.S. 914 (1977).
33. Id. at 873, 555 P.2d at 413.
34. Transcript of Hearing, Feb. 18, 1975, supra note 26, at 116. See Herman, Damage
Insurers Hit by Losses on Stocks, Rise in Claim Amounts, Wall St. J., Jan. 20, 1975, at 1,
col. 6; Sansweet, Teledyne Takes Drastic Steps in an Effort to Salvage Its Argonaut Insur-
ance Unit, Wall St. J., Jan. 30, 1975, at 26, col. 1.
35. Prendergast v. Nelson, 199 Neb. 97, 256 N.W.2d 657 (1977).
36. Id. at 100, 256 N.W.2d at 662.
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tors and insurers. A legislature had to choose between a pro-
tracted struggle with doctors and insurance companies to keep
health care available, under continuing threat of job actions by
doctors and withdrawal of malpractice coverage by the insurers,
and changing the legal arrangements governing malpractice legis-
lation. As the forces opposed to these changes had little capacity
to exert pressure and offered no solution to the problem of keep-
ing the health care system in operation, it is not surprising that
some legislatures (chose) to "solve" the problem by amending the
law.3
7
In Search of a Standard: When and to What
Extent May a Court Scrutinize Legislation?
A. The Concept of Representation
John Hart Ely, a leading commentator on constitutional law,
has described brilliantly the development of the concept of repre-
sentation in America." According to Ely, the framers of the Con-
stitution envisioned a representative democracy-a government
whose representatives would be "'of' the people," and who would
live under the regime of the laws they passed and not exempt
themselves from their operation.3 9 The theory was that the iden-
tity of interests between ruler and ruled would operate against op-
pressive legislation.40 If the elected rulers deviated from their du-
ties, the ruled would turn them out of office. 41 The flaw in the
system was the lack of protection of minority interests.
42
Recognizing that" 'the people' were [not] an essentially homo-
geneous group whose interests did not vary significantly, '43 James
Madison proposed a separation of powers so that "although at a
local level one 'faction' might well have sufficient clout to be able
to tyrannize others, in the national government no faction or inter-
est group would constitute a majority capable of exercising con-
trol. '4 4 Ultimately the Constitution provided for a separation of
powers not only between the state and federal governments, but
37. Reder I, supra note 1, at 515.
38. Ely, Toward a Representation-Reinforcing Mode of Judicial Review, 37 MD. L.
REv. 451 (1978). This article provides an excellent discussion of political process as under-
stood by the Framers of the Constitution and as it functions in this country today.
39. Id. at 457.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 458.
43. Id. at 459.
44. Id. at 460.
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among the legislative, judicial and executive functions of the na-
tional government.45 Even this separation of powers was not
enough to protect minorities; the framers understood that the in-
terests of minorities had to be tied to the interests of the majority
in order to ensure representation of the politically weak:
46
The framers of the Constitution knew, and we should not forget
today, that there is no more effective practical guaranty against
arbitrary and unreasonable government than to require that the
principles of law which officials would impose upon a minority
must be imposed generally. Conversely, nothing opens the door to
arbitrary action so effectively as to allow those officials to pick
and choose only a few to whom they will apply legislation and
thus to escape the political retribution that might be visited upon
them if larger numbers were affected. Courts can take no better
measure to assure that laws will be just than to require that laws
be equal in operation.4
7
By the early nineteenth century, the idea of representation
had developed to the point that two distinct duties toward minori-
ties were understood to exist
[A] duty on the part of representatives "virtually" to represent
the politically powerless, and even a sometime duty on the part of
constitutional courts to compel such virtual representation by in-
sisting that the majority tie its interests to those of the powerless
and by intervening specially when it had not done so.'8
The Fourteenth Amendment, ratified in 1868, made these duties
law.
4 9
B. Enforcement of the Fourteenth Amendment
Guarantee of Equal Protection
No State shall... deny to any person within its jurisdiction the
equal protection of the laws.
5 0
Equal protection is "the most chaotic, least thoughtfully con-
sidered, and least adequately justified area of constitutional law." '51
The doctrinal confusion has spread into the area of substantive
due process as the Court has borrowed from it in shaping equal
45. Id.
46. Id. at 462.
47. Id. at 463 (quoting Railway Express Agency, Inc. v. New York, 336 U.S. 106, 112-
13 (1949) (Jackson, J., concurring)).
48. Ely, supra note 38, at 469.
49. Id.
50. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
51. Forum: Equal Protection and the Burger Court, 2 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 645, 655
(1975) [hereinafter cited as Forum] (remarks of Gerald Gunther).
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protection;52 in fact, the two are sometimes difficult to distinguish,
partly because the Court has used equal protection and due pro-
cess standards interchangeably.53 The basis of the confusion seems
to be the Court's inability to decide when, and to what extent, it
may challenge the judgment of the legislature.54
The Court has used three standards 55 in reviewing legislation
on equal protection grounds. Traditional equal protection analysis
employs two of these standards, which are usually called "rational
basis" on the one hand and "strict scrutiny" or "compelling state
interest scrutiny" on the other.56 The problem with the two-tier
equal protection analysis is its rigidity:
[T]he lenient "rational basis" scrutiny applied to most statutes
almost never results in voidance of the legislation, though the
heightened "compelling state interest" scrutiny almost invariably
will. [The analysis] is rigid because in theory it permits only two
widely variant levels of scrutiny with no gradations for rights of
intermediate importance. It is deficient because, as Professor
Freund once remarked, this world does not move on a "binary
principle.
'57
Dissatisfied with traditional two-tier analysis, the Court re-
cently has moved tentatively into that intermediate area,58 using
what Professor Gunther, of Stanford University, has called "inten-
sified means scrutiny" or "means inquiry." 59
1. Rational Basis and Strict Scrutiny
The legislature must be able to classify persons in order to leg-
islate, and citizens may be treated differently according to the pur-
52. Id. at 647-49 (remarks of William R. Forrester).
53. Id. at 648.
54. See Gunther, The Supreme Court, 1971 Term-Foreward: In Search of Evolving
Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REv. 1
(1972); Nowak, Realigning the Standards of Review Under the Equal Protection Guaran-
tee-Prohibited, Neutral, and Permissive Classifications, 62 GEo. L.J. 1071 (1974); Wilkin-
son, The Supreme Court, the Equal Protection Clause, and the Three Faces of Constitu-
tional Equality, 61 VA. L. REv. 945 (1975); Forum, supra note 51.
55. Scholars disagree as to the number of standards that have been used in equal pro-
tection analysis. Gunther says there are two currently being used, see Forum, supra note 51.
Forrester says there are five (lectures by William R. Forrester, Professor of Law, Hastings
College of the Law (1979-1980)).
56. For a lengthy discussion of the traditional two-tier analysis, see Developments in
the Law-Equal Protection, 82 HAv. L. REv. 1065 (1969) [hereinafter cited as Develop-
ments in the Law].
57. Wilkinson, supra note 54, at 948 n.15.
58. Gunther, supra note 54, at 17.
59. Id. at 33.
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pose of the legislation in question.60 In theory, any classification
could be challenged as a denial of equal protection.6 1 In fact, how-
ever, a classification in the area of general economic and social wel-
fare legislation "will not be set aside if any state of facts reasona-
bly may be conceived to justify it."62 This standard, as it has been
used traditionally, is extremely deferential to the judgment of the
legislature; if the Court is able to conceive of any rational relation-
ship to a legitimate state interest, the law must stand, even absent
proof of rationality.6 s The Court will, however, subject to strict
scrutiny any law that sets up a suspect classification, or that inter-
feres with the exercise of a fundamental right, and if the govern-
ment is unable to show a "compelling governmental interest" in
making the classification, the law will not stand. 4 The traditional
indicia of "suspectness" are: whether "the class is . . . saddled
with such disabilities, or subjected to such a history of purposeful
or unequal treatment, or relegated to such a position of political
powerlessness as to command extraordinary protection from the
majoritarian political process. ' 65 Classifications based on race,66
national origin,67 and alienage 8 have been found suspect. Under
the traditional analysis, a right may be deemed fundamental only
if the Constitution implicitly or explicitly guarantees it.6 The right
to trave17 0 and the right to vote7 1 are among the rights that have
been declared fundamental by the Court.
72
2. The Middle Tier
The Warren Court, working within the two-tier analysis,
sought, nonetheless, to take a more active role in reviewing legisla-
60. Developments in the Law, supra note 56, at 1076.
61. Id.
62. McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 426 (1961).
63. Nowak, supra note 54, at 1073.
64. San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973). See note 54
supra.
65. 411 U.S. 1, 28. But see Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
66. See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11 (1967); McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184,
191-92 (1964).
67. See Oyama v. California, 332 U.S. 633, 644-46 (1948); Hirabayashi v. United
States, 320 U.S. 81, 100 (1943).
68. See In re Giffiths, 413 U.S. 717, 721-22 (1973); Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S.
365, 372 (1971).
69. San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 33-34 (1973). See
note 54 supra.
70. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
71. Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972).
72. See note 54 supra.
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tion. 3 The Court used the strict scrutiny test, justifying its analy-
sis by finding suspect classifications without explanation or by en-
larging the list of fundamental rights.7 4 The Burger Court, with the
exception of Justice Rehnquist,7 5 has not in philosophy abandoned
the trend started by the Warren Court, but it has slowed the mo-
mentum.76 The Burger Court has also deviated from the tradi-
tional analysis, although nominally adhering to it." The Court has
subjected classifications based on sex,78 illegitimacy 9 and indi-
gencya0 to an "unspecified level of heightened review"81-a practice
that has prompted legal scholars such as Professor Jesse Choper to
remark that "one cannot discern or predict any really meaningful
doctrine, so far as the Court's equal protection decisions go.
'"82
Other observers of the Court have remarked that it has been er-
ratic in its application of its own standards, "particularly in those
difficult cases where an egalitarian result seems desirable, but
without far-reaching doctrinal consequences. "83
The Court has been particularly inconsistent in its application
of the rational basis test. 4 Professor Gunther noted the Burger
Court's use of the rational basis test in his 1972 Harvard Law Re-
view Foreward and sketched a model for future decisions:
The model suggested by the recent developments would view
equal protection as a means-focused, relatively narrow, preferred
ground of decision in a broad range of cases. Stated most simply,
it would have the Court take seriously a constitutional require-
ment that has never been formally abandoned: that legislative
means must substantially further legislative ends .... Putting
consistent new bite into the old equal protection would mean that
the Court would be less willing to supply justifying rationales by
73. See Gunther, supra note 54.
74. Forum, supra note 51.
75. See Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762, 777 (1977) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); Craig
v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 217 (1976) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); Gunther, supra note 54, at 10-
11. But see Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636, 655 (1975) (Rehnquist, J., concurring).
76. San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973) (those who
reside in comparatively poor school districts not a suspect class); See Jefferson v. Hackney,
406 U.S. 535 (1972) and Richardson v. Belcher, 404 U.S. 78 (1971) (allocation of welfare not
subject to strict scrutiny); Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56 (1972) (housing not a fundamen-
tal right).
77. See Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971).
78. See Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973).
79. See Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164 (1972).
80. See Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963).
81. Wilkinson, supra note 54, at 951. See note 54 supra.
82. Forum, supra note 51, at 655.
83. Wilkinson, supra note 54, at 951. See Nowak, supra note 54, at 1073.
84. See Nowak, supra note 54, at 1073.
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exercising its imagination. It would have the Court assess the
means in terms of legislative purposes that have substantial basis
in actuality, not merely in conjecture. Moreover, it would have
the Justices gauge the reasonableness of questionable means on
the basis of materials that are offered to the Court, rather than
resorting to rationalizations created by perfunctory judicial hy-
pothesizing.85 . . . The means-oriented scrutiny of this model
would be applicable to a wide range of statutes, including the so-
cial and economic regulatory legislation that has been the most
characteristic context for expressions of the hands off attitude of
the last generation.86
Gunther had hoped that the Court would consistently apply the
rational basis test with more "bite," even in cases involving neither
fundamental rights nor suspect classifications; 87 however, in 1975
he commented that, although elements of his argument had ap-
peared in various opinions,8 the "minimal-rationality-with-bite"
approach was still "being applied in an ad hoc manner."8 9
Gunther argued that the Court should "concern itself solely
with means, not with ends," 90 but after he formulated his model,
the Court proceeded to examine legislative ends.91 Another promi-
nent scholar, John Nowak, suggested a new standard of review
based partly on review of legislative ends:
Under this standard, the Court must first ask if there is any theo-
retically rational relationship between the classification and a
state interest capable of withstanding analysis; if none can be hy-
pothesized, a further inquiry is not required because the classifi-
cation violates the minimal standard of review. If the Court can
imagine a theoretically rational government interest, the Court
then must determine whether the classification is in fact arbi-
trary. Only by requiring that the asserted basis of the classifica-
tion be capable of withstanding analysis can the Court insure that
the classification is not being used arbitrarily to burden persons
having a common personal status.92
Professor Nowak named this standard the "demonstrable basis"
85. Gunther, supra note 54, at 20-21.
86. Id. at 23.
87. Forum, supra note 51, at 657.
88. Id. at 658.
89. Id. at 659. See Nowak, supra note 54, at 1073; Wilkinson, supra note 54, at 950-51.
90. Gunther, supra note 54, at 21.
91. Nowak, supra note 54, at 1077-79; Stone, Equal Protection in Special Admissions
Programs: Forward from Bakke, 6 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 719, 736-42 (1979). See, e.g., Re-
gents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976).
92. Nowak, supra note 54, at 1081.
Fall 1980]
136 HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY
standard.93 He recognized a loophole in Gunther's reasoning: if a
court were unable to scrutinize legislative ends, only means, then
there could be cases where a classification would be a rational
means of furthering an apparently legitimate state interest, but
the court would be unable to examine the stated basis of the law to
see if it could in fact withstand analysis.
9 4
Nowak's model specifies three legislative categories and three
corresponding standards of review.95 His "suspect-prohibited clas-
sifications," which include racial classifications only, are to be re-
viewed under what he calls the "prohibited" standard, which is
like the strict scrutiny standard in effect.9 "Permissive classifica-
tions" are those whereby the legislation "treats classes in a dissimi-
lar manner but does not employ a 'prohibited' or a 'neutral' 7 clas-
sification as the basis of dissimilar treatment."' s  These
classifications are to be reviewed under the "conceivable basis"
standard-in other words, the traditional rational basis test.99 The
intermediate standard is the "demonstrable basis" test described
above, which is to be invoked only when the classification in ques-
tion is "neutral." Nowak defines a classification as "neutral" if "it
treats persons in a dissimilar manner on the basis of some inherent
human characteristic or status (other than racial heritage), or lim-
its the exercise of a fundamental right by a class of persons." 100
Nowak summarizes the problems with the current system of review
as follows:
The Court has recognized that fundamental rights may be limited
and that som6 groups defined by personal characteristics may be
distinguished from other segments of the population for non-dis-
criminatory purposes. In these cases, the Court is confronted with
legislation which may be factually justifiable despite appearing on
its face to be a denial of equal protection. These classifications,
when based on personal status or limitations of fundamental
rights, are not clearly forbidden, but neither are they entirely
within the legislative prerogative. Thus, they are constitutionally
"neutral" classifications .... Rigid adherence to the Court's
traditional two-tiered approach in such cases would not be appro-
priate. If the Court sustained neutral classifications whenever
they had a conceivable rational relationship to a legitimate end
93. Id.
94. See id.
95. Id. at 1093-94.
96. Id. at 1093.
97. The definition of "neutral" follows in the text below.
98. Nowak, supra note 54, at 1094.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 1093-94.
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without testing the factual foundations of that basis, it, in effect,
would abdicate its role as the interpreter of basic constitutional
principles. A legislature would be able to contravene these princi-
ples whenever it could assert a theoretical basis for its actions
even though no such basis was demonstrable. Nor should the
Court apply to these cases the standard which it uses to review
racial classifications. If it applied such a test, it, in effect, would
forbid legislatures from making rational distinctions between
classes of persons or restrictions upon the exercise of rights which
serve sufficient state interests. 10 1
Equal protection doctrine is in a state of flux, applied by a
Court that is reaching for more egalitarian results without commit-
ting itself to firmly articulated standards.0 2 Commentators have
tried to articulate standards for the Court, but they disagree
among themselves as to how equal protection analysis should pro-
ceed, and particularly as to which elements of the legislative pro-
cess the Court may examine.10 s Nearly all concerned agree that the
traditional two-tier approach is inadequate and should be modified
to allow for more judicial intervention in support of constitutional
principles.104 The intermediate standard of review, which gained
widespread recognition in cases of gender-based discrimination,10°
has been extended to classifications based on illegitimacy.10 Equal
protection doctrine may continue to evolve in the direction sug-
gested by Professors Gunther and Nowak, that is, toward closer
scrutiny of legislative means and ends in a broader range of dis-
criminatory classifications, with much less deference to legislative
judgment.10 7 If this evolution persists, there may be a proliferation
of "suspect" or "neutral" classifications, or an extension of the list
of fundamental rights. 0 8 The Court may become increasingly ac-
tivist, giving effect to our system of checks and balances and sepa-
ration of powers. Critics who object to increased intervention as a
hindrance upon the legislature and interference by the Court
101. Id. at 1096.
102. See note 54 supra.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971). The court, by way of a standard, stated that
statutory classifications that distinguish between males and females are "subject to scrutiny
under the Equal Protection Clause." Id. at 75. A classification "must be reasonable, not
arbitrary, and must rest upon some ground of difference having a fair and substantial rela-
tion to the object of the legislation, so that all persons similarly circumstanced shall be
treated alike." Id. at 76, (quoting Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412, 415 (1920)).
106. Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762 (1977); Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495 (1976).
107. See note 54 supra.
108. Id.
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might consider the admonition that:
[t]his "separation of powers" was obviously not instituted with
the idea that it would promote governmental efficiency. It was, on
the contrary, looked to as a bulwark against tyranny. For if gov-
ernmental power is fractionalized, if a given power can be imple-
mented only by a combination of legislative enactment, judicial
application, and executive implementation, no man or group of
men will be able to impose its unchecked will."0 9
C. Equal Protection and Medical Malpractice
Legislation
1. The Limit on Recovery of Damages: California Civil Code sec-
tion 3333.2 and a Summary of the Treatment of Similar Provi-
sions in Other States
With the passage of AB1XX in California, section 3333.2 was
added to the Civil Code:
(a) In any action for injury against a health care provider based
on professional negligence, the injured plaintiff shall be entitled
to recover noneconomic losses to compensate for pain, suffering,
inconvenience, physical impairment, disfigurement and other
nonpecuniary damage.
(b) In no action shall the amount of damages for noneconomic
losses exceed two hundred fifty thousand dollars ($250,000).""
This provision has not yet been tested in the California courts."'1
Similar provisions in other states have been challenged; the
courts in those states chose different standards for evaluating the
statutes' constitutionality and reached different results. The Ne-
braska Supreme Court upheld that state's $500,000 limit on all
damages in medical malpractice cases,1 2 using the rational basis
test."$ The Illinois Supreme Court struck down the Illinois statute
limiting all damages in medical malpractice cases to $500,000 with-
out stating which equal protection standard it was using.1 4 The
Idaho Supreme Court refused to rule on the merits of the constitu-
tional challenges to Idaho's complex damages limitation provision;
that court adopted the "means focus" or "means scrutiny" test as
109. United States v. Brown, 381 U.S. 437, 443 (1965).
110. CAL. CIv. CODE §3333.2 (West 1975).
111. For a detailed study of the entire Act and a proposed model for equal protection
analysis in the California courts, see Note, California's Medical Injury Compensation Re-
form Act: An Equal Protection Challenge, 52 U.S.C. L. REv. 829 (1979).
112. Prendergast v. Nelson, 199 Neb. 97, 256 N.W.2d 657 (1977).
113. Id.
114. Wright v. Central Du Page Hosp. Ass'n, 63 Ill. 2d 313, 347 N.E.2d 736 (1976).
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set out by the United States Supreme Court in Reed v. Reed as the
appropriate standard, but remanded the case to the district court
for additional findings.115 Two state courts in Ohio invalidated
damages limitations, in dicta, on equal protection and due process
grounds. 6 The equal protection analysis was unclear, as it bor-
rowed language from the strict scrutiny and means scrutiny
tests." ' Most recently, the Supreme Court of North Dakota invali-
dated a $300,000 limit on all damages in actions against health
care providers, using as its standard a "close correspondence be-
tween statutory classification and legislative goals."118 These cases
will be treated in more detail below.
2. The Cases on Damages Limitations
a. Prendergast v. Nelson
In Prendergast v. Nelson,"9 a fragmented Nebraska Supreme
Court found the Nebraska Hospital-Medical Liability Act constitu-
tional. The defendant was the Director of Insurance, who provoked
the action by refusing to implement the law.1 20 The court rejected
the defendant's argument that the law "operates to single out a
class of people for special treatment, but bears no rational relation-
ship to the legitimate purposes of the legislation. 1 21 Although
some of the language in the opinion resembles "means scrutiny"
language' 22 and although the court itself designates adequate med-
ical care a "fundamental right,"'13 the court apparently intended
to follow the traditional restrained standard of review. The opinion
cites Dandridge v. Williams'" for the proposition that classifica-
tions in the area of economics and social welfare are to be left to
the discretion of the legislature, and that " ' it is enough that the
State's action be rationally based and free from invidious discrimi-
115. Jones v. State Bd. of Medicine, 97 Idaho 859, 555 P.2d 399 (1976), cert. denied,
431 U.S. 914 (1977).
116. Simon v. St. Elizabeth Medical Center, 355 N.E.2d 903 (Ohio C.P. Montgomery
County 1976); Graley v. Satayatham, 343 N.E.2d 832 (Ohio C.D. Cuyahoga County 1976).
117. Simon v. St. Elizabeth Medical Center, 355 N.E.2d 903 (Ohio C.P. Montgomery
County 1976); Graley v. Satayatham, 343 N.E.2d 832 (Ohio C.P. Cuyahoga County 1976).
118. Arneson v. Olson, 270 N.W.2d 125 (N.D. 1978).
119. 199 Neb. 97, 256 N.W.2d 657 (1977).
120. Id. at 100, 256 N.W.2d at 662.
121. Id. at 112, 256 N.W.2d at 667. The classification in this case was medical mal-
practice victims as distinguished from the victims of tortfeasors other than doctors or
hospitals.
122. See id. at 112, 115, 256 N.W.2d at 667, 669.
123. Id. at 114, 256 N.W.2d at 668.
124. 397 U.S. 471 (1970).
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nation.' ,,125 The Nebraska court predicated its decision solely upon
the existence of a malpractice insurance "crisis": "The classifica-
tion does have a reasonable basis. The Legislature acted to meet a
crisis situation.
'126
The dissenting opinions indicate some confusion and doubt.
Justice White of Nebraska wrote:
I agree that it was within the power of the Legislature to deter-
mine that a medical malpractice crisis exists although the record
before us does not reflect the existence of such a crisis. If there
has been an explosion in malpractice claims, the resulting inunda-
tion has not reached this court .... Were it within the province
of this court to determine whether a sufficient emergency exists to
warrant the separate and differing treatment of medical malprac-
tice from the remainder of the body of tort law, I would un-
hesitatingly suggest that no such evidence has yet been presented
us.
1 27
Justice White's assessment of the standard used in the majority
opinion suggests means scrutiny: "The test is, as the majority opin-
ion points out, that of the reasonable relationship of the means
utilized to the purpose to be achieved." 12 8 Yet the majority appears
to employ the rational basis test: "We will not set aside a statutory
discrimination if any state of facts reasonably exists to justify
it. 12 9 Based on his means scrutiny analysis Justice White finds un-
constitutional those provisions of the Act that restrict the liability
of tortfeasors in medical malpractice cases: "This is a significant
deviation from the total concept of restitution in that a negligent
party may escape paying for a portion of the damage he causes.13 0
. . . [T]he burden is shifted not to a collateral source, but to the
malpractice victim himself."13 1 White notes the relative powerless-
ness of patients and discusses it in the context of the statute's pro-
vision that allows a patient to elect not to come within the provi-
sions of the Act:
132
Such an election provision ignores the inequality of bargaining
power. The very nature of a person's status as a patient places
125. 199 Neb. at 113, 256 N.W.2d at 668 (quoting Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471
(1970)).
126. 199 Neb. at 113, 256 N.W.2d at 668.
127. Id. at 127, 256 N.W.2d at 674 (White, J., dissenting in part). Judges Clinton,
McCown and Boslaugh agreed with White on this point.
128. Id. at 129, 256 N.W.2d at 675.
129. Id. at 115, 256 N.W.2d at 669.
130. Id. at 129, 256 N.W.2d at 675.
131. Id. at 130, 256 N.W.2d at 676.
132. Id. at 101, 256 N.W.2d at 662. Part of the court's justification for upholding the
constitutionality of the Act was this election provision.
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him in a position which makes effective bargaining difficult. A
right to elect not to be covered, from which might result a denial
of service from the only hospital or physician in a geographical
area, can hardly be said to be without implicit coercion.33
b. Wright v. Central Du Page Hospital Association
In Wright v. Central Du Page Hospital Association, the Illi-
nois Supreme Court affirmed in part the judgment of the state ap-
pellate court, which held in part that: "the monetary limitation on
a medical malpractice recovery constituted special legislation in vi-
olation of. .. the Illinois Constitution, denied plaintiff equal pro-
tection and due process of law under the Federal and Illinois con-
stitutions and denied her a full remedy for injuries to her person in
violation of. . . the Illinois Constitution.
'13 4
The segment of the majority opinion pertaining to damages
limitations addresses the arguments of the parties, starting with
the plaintiff's argument that the Illinois legislature "has arbitrarily
classified, and unreasonably discriminated against, the most seri-
ously injured victims of medical malpractice, but has not limited
the recovery of those victims who suffer moderate or minor inju-
ries."13 5 After defining the allegedly discriminatory classification
and stating that the basis for it is what the defense calls "the
'medical malpractice crisis,' "138 the court ceases to discuss equal
protection, analyzing instead Illinois common law and statutory
rights to compensation.37 The court considers the Illinois Consti-
tution, but ignores the United States Constitution, 8 and con-
cludes that "limiting recovery only in medical malpractice actions
to $500,000 is arbitrary and constitutes a special law in violation of
. . . the [Illinois] Constitution . . . .
Justice Underwood, concurring in part and dissenting in part,
is more precise; he assumes that there is enough of a "crisis" to
warrant the $500,000 limitation and cites McGowan v. Maryland
to support the court's use of the rational basis standard.
14 0
133. Id. at 132, 256 N.W.2d at 676-77. At least one other commentator has mentioned
the same problem in relation to medical malpractice arbitration provisions. See Sulnick,
Medical Malpractice Reform Act (1975): The Failure of ABIXX (Keene) to Deal With
Medical Malpractice-A Constitutional Tragedy, 1976 CAL. TRiAL L.J. 17.
134. 63 III. 2d at 325, 347 N.E.2d at 741.
135. Id.
136. Id. at 326, 347 N.E.2d at 741.
137. Id. at 326-29, 347 N.E.2d at 741-43.
138. Id.
139. Id. at 330, 347 N.E.2d at 743.
140. Id. at 335, 347 N.E.2d at 746 (Underwood, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
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The court's reasoning is confusing, but evidences a belief that
a privilege is being created on behalf of doctors and insurance
companies, 141 and that seriously injured plaintiffs in medical mal-
practice cases as a result stand to lose their right to full compensa-
tion without receiving anything in return.142
c. Jones v. State Board of Medicine
The 1975 Hospital-Medical Liability Act of Idaho provided a
limit on recoverable damages against physicians of $150,000 per
claim and $300,000 per occurrence. 43 A similar limit was placed
upon damages in actions against acute care hospitals: $150,000 per
claim and $300,000 per occurrence or the amount of $10,000 multi-
plied by the total number of beds in the hospital.14 4 In addition,
recovery was restricted to compensatory damages not satisfied
from collateral sources.145
The district court found the Act unconstitutional under the
Idaho Constitution as a violation of the fundamental right "of citi-
zens to seek redress for a breach of duty."1 46 On appeal, the Idaho
Supreme Court clarified the standard to be used in evaluating the
constitutionality of the Act, but declined to rule on the merits. 47
The court remanded the case for further findings.1 48
The court defined the classification as one that "distinguishes
between those who are damaged as a result of medical malpractice
in amounts exceeding $150,000 as contrasted with others likewise
damaged by medical malpractice but whose damages are less than
$150,000. '1149 The classification denied full recovery to those dam-
aged in excess of the statutory limitation. The court rejected the
respondents' argument that this classification was suspect or that
it contravened a fundamental right,150 and rejected also the appel-
lants' argument that the standard to be used was the rational basis
part).
141. See id. at 329, 347 N.E.2d at 743.
142. Id. at 328, 347 N.E.2d at 742.
143. IDAHO CODE §39-4204.
144. Id. at §39-4205.
145. Id. at §39-4210.
146. Unreported opinion of the District Court, Fourth Judicial District, Ada County,
cited in Jones v. State Bd of Medicine, 97 Idaho 859, 863, 555 P.2d 399, 403 (1976), cert.
denied, 431 U.S. 914 (1977).
147. Jones v. State Bd. of Medicine, 97 Idaho 859, 555 P.2d 399 (1976), cert. denied,
431 U.S. 914 (1977).
148. 97 Idaho 859, 555 P.2d 399.




test as set forth in McGowan v. Maryland.151 The court chose in-
stead to use the standard enunciated in Reed v. Reed, 52 that the
classification be substantially related to an important governmen-
tal interest. 5 ' The court noted that: "[tihat test scrutinizes the
means by which the challenged legislation is said to affect [sic] its
articulated and otherwise legitimate purpose. '154 Justifying its
choice of standard, the court stated:
[W]here the discriminatory character of a challenged statutory
classification is apparent on its face and where there is also a pat-
ent indication of a lack of relationship between the classification
and the declared purpose of the statute, then a more stringent
judicial inquiry is required beyond that mandated by McGowen
[sic]. That common thread runs through all the cases in which
the Royster-Reed test has been applied by this Court.
Here it is apparent from the face of the Act that a discriminatory
classification is created based on the degree of injury and damage
suffered as a result of medical malpractice. Rather obviously al-
though the Act is said to be designed to insure continued health
care to the citizens of Idaho it cannot do other than confer an
advantage on doctors and hospitals at the expense of the more
seriously injured and damaged persons.155
Because the appellants had presented their case in terms of
the McGowan standard and, accordingly, had not offered evidence
as to how the disputed classification related to the articulated pur-
pose of ensuring the availability of medical care to the people of
Idaho, the court remanded the case for further proceedings. 15
d. Graley v. Satayatham and Simon v. St. Elizabeth Medical
Center
Two Ohio state courts, in dicta, found damages limitations un-
constitutional under the Ohio and United States Constitutions, on
equal protection and due process grounds.' 1" The Simon Court
adopted the Graley Court's equal protection analysis.158
151. Id. at 871, 555 P.2d at 411.
152. 404 U.S. 71 (1971).
153. 97 Idaho at 871, 555 P.2d at 411. See Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 76 (1971).
154. 97 Idaho at 871, 555 P.2d at 411.
155. Id.
156. Id. at 871-72, 555 P.2d at 411-12.
157. Simon v. St. Elizabeth Medical Center, 355 N.E.2d 903 (Ohio C.P. Montgomery
County 1976); Graley v. Satayatham, 343 N.E.2d 832 (Ohio C.P. Cuyahoga County 1976).
158. 355 N.E.2d at 906.
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In Graley, as in Prendergast"9 and Wright,1 60 the standard
upon which the court based its decision is not clearly articulated;
some of the language the court cites hints at strict scrutiny, some
is drawn from means scrutiny. For example, the court states: "This
is not to say that separate classifications are, in all cases, constitu-
tionally infirm; it is to say that separate classifications are invalid
in circumstances where it is not demonstrable that 'a compelling
governmental interest' exists."161 This statement is misleading; the
compelling interest component is drawn from the strict scrutiny
test, which applies only when a challenged classification infringes
upon the exercise of a fundamental right or appears to be
suspect.16
2
In the very next sentence the court states: "In other words, a
statutory classification cannot be tolerated unless a legitimate leg-
islative objective is furthered by the classification.""1 3 This lan-
guage, which seems to require an examination of the means and
end of the legislation, suggests means scrutiny. Such confusion of
standards belies the court's familiarity with equal protection anal-
ysis, later demonstrated in its synopsis of traditional equal protec-
tion tests."6
Nonetheless, without clearly stating the standard the court de-
clared that the law was discriminatory and that there was no com-
pelling government interest to justify it in the face of equal protec-
tion requirements:
There is no satisfactory reason for this separate and unequal
treatment. There obviously is "no compelling governmental inter-
est" unless it be argued that any segment of the public in
financial distress be at least partly relieved of financial accounta-
bility for its negligence. To articulate the requirement is to
demonstrate its absurdity, for at one time or another every type
of profession or business undergoes difficult times, and it is not
the business of government to manipulate the law so as to provide
succor to one class, the medical, by depriving another, the mal-
practiced patients, of the equal protection mandated by the
constitution.165
159. 199 Neb. 97, 256 N.W.2d 657 (1977).
160. 63 Ill. 2d 313, 347 N.E.2d 736 (1976).
161. 343 N.E.2d at 836.
162. San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
163. 343 N.E.2d at 836 (citing McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961)).
164. 343 N.E.2d at 837.
165. Id.
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e. Arneson v. Olson
In August of 1978, the Supreme Court of North Dakota up-
held a trial court finding that the $300,000 total liability limit of
North Dakota's Medical Malpractice Act was unconstitutional. 16
The court, after discussing rational basis, strict scrutiny, and a
third level of equal protection review that requires "a 'close corre-
spondence between statutory classification and legislative
goals,' ",167 followed the example set by the Idaho court in Jones v.
State Board of Medicine,'68 and independently examined the legis-
lative justification of the Act.
Noting that "no state court of last resort has upheld a limita-
tion so low," the court noted that the legislative purposes, articu-
lated in the preamble to the statute, included: "assurance of avail-
ability of competent medical and hospital services at reasonable
cost, elimination of the expense involved in non-meritorious mal-
practice claims, provision of adequate compensation to patients
with meritorious claims, and the encouragement of physicians to
enter into practice in North Dakota and remain in such practice so
long as they are qualified to do so.''""9 The court concluded that
"the limitation of recovery does not provide adequate compensa-
tion to patients with meritorious claims; 17 0 and that the Act "does
nothing toward the elimination of non-meritorious claims. 17 1 The
court also determined that, although restrictions on recovery might
encourage physicians to practice in North Dakota, that result
would be obtained "only at the expense of claimants with meritori-
ous claims. 17 2 The court then examined the alleged "crisis" and
found that none existed. Evidence presented to the trial court indi-
cated that "the incidence of malpractice claims in North Dakota is
far lower than the average in the United States" and that a major
insurance company accepted applications for malpractice insur-
ance in North Dakota at rates lower than the national average.17 8
Significantly, the court objected strongly to an election provi-
sion similar to the one Justice White of Nebraska condemned in
his dissent in Prendergast v. Nelson:17"
166. 270 N.W.2d 125 (N.D. 1978).
167. Id. at 133.
168. Id.
169. Id. at 135.
170. Id.
171. Id. at 135-36.
172. Id. at 136.
173. Id.
174. See notes 130-31 and accompanying text supra.
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The Legislature attempted to meet some of the anticipated con-
stitutional objections to (the Act) by providing that it applied
only to patients who "consented" to its provisions. . . .It is pro-
vided that "In the event a patient does not consent pursuant to
this section, the physician shall decide whether he will or will not
provide services to the patient." It is further provided that "In
the event emergency treatment is required, such person is subject
to the terms and provisions of this chapter." Thus it is conclu-
sively presumed that an unconscious patient or other patient re-
quiring emergency care consents to treatment, but in the absence
of consent by a nonemergency patient, the physician is under no
obligation to provide any care at all. The only choices available to
the patient who is refused care apparently are to suffer or die of
his ailment or to travel outside the State to obtain medical
attention.
17 5
The harshness of this provision was one of the factors the Court
considered in determining the constitutionality of the statute.
176
After finding that several provisions of the Act were unconsti-
tutional, the North Dakota Supreme Court concluded that the leg-
islature would not have enacted it without those voided provisions,
particularly not without the damages limitation. Having so deter-
mined, the court invalidated the entire Act.
1
7
3. A Question of Status
The opinions of the courts in the above cases differ not only in
choice of standard of review, but in analysis of the classification
made and the manner in which it discriminates. The court in Pren-
dergast v. Nelson defined the classification as patients injured in
the course of medical treatment and the discrimination as between
such patients and other tort victims." 8 The Wright Court defined
the class as "the most seriously injured victims of medical mal-
practice" and the discrimination as between them and "those vic-
tims who suffer moderate or minor injuries. 1 79 The Jones Court
defined the classification as patients damaged in an amount
greater than $150,000, and the discrimination as between those pa-
tients and patients damaged in a lesser amount.180 The Graley
Court drew distinctions between "medical malpractice defendants"
175. 270 N.W.2d at 133-34.
176. Id. at 134.
177. Id. at 137-38.
178. See 199 Neb. at 114, 256 N.W.2d at 668.
179. 63 Ml.2d at 325, 347 N.E.2d at 741. The Arneson Court adopted this definition,
270 N.W.2d at 136.
180. 97 Idaho at 870, 555 P.2d at 410.
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versus defendants in other tort actions,181 medical malpractice vic-
tims versus victims of other tortfeasors,182 and doctors versus other
professionals. 8
Although none of these definitions is "wrong," at least one
commenator1' would shift the focus to the status distinction be-
tween doctors and patients to show how medically injured patients
are singled out from other tort victims for adverse treatment. Pro-
fessor Robert Sulnick, of Loyola School of Law in Los Angeles, ob-
jected to California's AB1XX:
AB1XX... interfere[s] with the common law process by: (1) dis-
criminating against classes of persons, who because of their status
as patients have limitations imposed upon their ability to exercise
their common law right to sue one who negligently provides them
with health care services; and (2) by preventing said litigation
from being carried to its logical conclusion-i.e., jury verdict, un-
restricted by a statutorily imposed ceiling.185
Arguing that AB1XX is irrational and therefore unconstitu-
tional, Sulnick offers the following hypothetical situation:
Even if a jury were to decide.., that based on a calculated per
diem, [a medical malpractice] Plaintiff's pain and suffering trans-
lated into the sum of... $300,000, the Plaintiff could only be
awarded... $250,000. The irrationality of such a circumstance is
that the only reason such a Plaintiff could not recover the ...
$300,000 is because he/she was a patient and the Defendant was
... a health care provider .... [I]f that same highly trained pro-
fessional negligently ran his/her automobile into the same Plain-
tiff, and a jury assessed the Plaintiff's noneconomic loss to be...
$300,000, the Plaintiff would be allowed the full recovery.186
While a court using the traditional rational basis test might find
such a result justifiable, Sulnick's opposition to the law is founded
in part upon his doubt as to the existence of a malpractice insur-
ance "crisis, 111 7 and his feeling that even if a "crisis" could be
found, the system of loss allocation should be changed before the
common law right to sue for negligence is impaired.188 According to
Sulnick, California's malpractice legislation runs counter to the
common law trend toward removing barriers of status that prevent
181. 343 N.E.2d at 836.
182. Id.
183. Id. at 837.
184. Sulnick, supra note 131.
185. Id. at 19.
186. Id. at 20.
187. Id. at 51-53.
188. Id. at 53-54.
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damaged persons from suing certain classes of people.'89 As Justice
Mathew 0. Tobriner of the California Supreme Court has said:
In the nineteenth century, when government became anxious to
encourage entrepreneurs, the courts, abandoning the older strict
rules, developed a series of legalisms to protect the favored owner
of factory or land from possible damages for tortious conduct. To
prevent plaintiffs from presenting emotionally-charged cases to
juries, courts invented such barriers as proximate causation, the
Puritan concept of contributory negligence, the fellow-servant
doctrine, and the idea of "duty" .... Today, perhaps the law of
torts may be in the process of another swing. It is discarding
many of the nineteenth century barriers imposed to protect fac-
tory owners and landlords .... 19 0
These changes are primarily a result of the development of a
society in which individuals depend upon bureaucratized institu-
tions for goods and services. 191 Sulnick argues that the malpractice
problem must be viewed in the context of a society thiat, by its
nature, breeds malpractice:
The industrial revolution produced a bureaucratized, mass society
which, in turn, will inevitably produce institutional "malpractice"
... [B]ureaucratic institutions can, and do as a matter of course,
malfunction. In other words, they function to service their own
ends, as opposed to the needs of the "mass" they were designed
to service. The "elite" are guilty of malpractice. Thus, what we
see, from this perspective, is a society wherein the individual is
literally in an inferior position to communicate with the institu-
tionalized, bureaucratized, elitest [sic] providers of the goods and
services necessary to (1) subsist, and (2) exist with a degree of
quality.'
9 2
According to Sulnick's theory, organized medicine is no less of an
elite, bureaucratized industry than the automotive industry or
banking.1
93
The most effective way, Sulnick feels, to attack institutional
malpractice is to force the culprit to pay:
Money, while a symbol, is also the lifeblood of an institutional-
ized society. Funds are essential to buy bureaucrats; bureaucra-
cies cannot be run without bureaucrats. If one can force an insti-
tution to expend funds, one can curtail its ability to function
189. Id. at 20-24.
190. Tobriner, The Changing Concept of Duty in the Law of Torts, 1970 CAL. TRIA
L.J. 18.
191. Id. at 17; Sulnick, supra note 131.
192. Sulnick, supra note 131, at 26-27.
193. Id. at 27.
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according to its internal policy. Thus, forcing an institution to
pay out funds, through the instrument of a damage award, creates
institutional frustration which becomes the catalyst to coerce pol-
icy changes.12
If damages provide the catalyst for positive change in the behavior
of an elite, institutional tortfeasor, then legislation that inhibits a
plaintiff's ability to sue for damages is, according to Sulnick, "irra-
tional.' 1 95 Sulnick is not alone in this view. The court in Graley
said:
The extending of special litigation benefits to the medical profes-
sion certainly cannot be considered as relating to protection of
the public health. On the contrary, the quality of health care may
actually decline. To the extent that in tort actions of the malprac-
tice type ... the medical profession is less accountable than for-
merly, relaxation of medical standards may occur with the public
the victim.198
Conclusion
Proponents of medical malpractice legislation in the various
states assume that the legislation is for economic regulation and
social welfare, that the reforms fall within the legitimate health,
safety and -police authority of the state, and that the proper stan-
dard for evaluating the legislation under the state and federal con-
stitutions is the "rational basis" standard. Proponents point to the
insurance "crisis," directing attention and logic away from the an-
tithetical interests of politically weak patients on the one hand,
and doctors and their insurers, who enjoy the advantages of organ-
ized power and wealth, on the other.
The courts are being asked to review medical malpractice leg-
islation but are not being provided material information. Have the
interests of the class of potential medical malpractice claimants
been adequately represented? Have the members of the legislature
194. Id. at 29.
195. Id. at 29-30.
196. 343 N.E.2d at 838. The California Court of Appeal recently expressed the same
viewpoint, quoting Graley in American Bank & Trust Co. v. Community Hosp. of Los
Gatos-Saratoga, Inc., 104 Cal. App. 3d 219, 163 Cal. Reptr. 513 (1980). In that case the
California court, using the rational basis standard, found unconstitutional section 667.7 of
the California Code of Civil Procedure, which provides, inter alia, for periodic payments by
tortfeasor health care providers of future damages in excess of $50,000. The court con-
cluded: "[To find that the protection and special dispensation given to health delivery
tortfeasors by the challenged legislation is in the best interest of public health is illogical to
the point of irrationality." Id. at 235, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 522. American Bank & Trust is
currently on appeal before the California Supreme Court.
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identified their interests with those of the class whose rights they
have limited by passing this legislation? Has a status distinction of
the variety described by Justice Tobriner 9 7 been imposed upon
patients so that doctors and their insurers may protect their prof-
its? Was there a "crisis," or did the insurance industry seize upon
events in order to create a panic among doctors and their patients
so that legislation favorable to them might be passed? Answers to
these questions bear upon the nature and legitimacy of the govern-
ment's interest, and must therefore affect the outcome of the
courts' equal protection analyses.
The cases that have dealt with medical malpractice damages
limitations indicate considerable doubt as to the adequacy of rep-
resentation of potential malpractice victims. Only one of the six
cases discussed above upheld the legislation outright, and even in
that case four judges dissented, questioning the existence of a "cri-
sis" and objecting to the reduction of plaintiff's rights. The other
five opinions found objectionable what the courts felt was a privi-
lege being created on behalf of doctors at the expense of their pa-
tients. All five chose a higher standard of review than the rational
basis test.
If, as Professor Nowak has pointed out, a court sustains a
questionable classification under the rational basis standard, refus-
ing to test the factual foundations of the purported basis, then that
court "abdicate[s] its role as the interpreter of basic constitutional
principles." 198 The courts, were they to sustain the classifications
here in issue, might allow shrewd and organized industries to do
violence to our system of separation of powers and thereby seize
unwarranted privileges. An industry could create a "crisis," use its
lobbying power to have legislation favorable to it passed, withhold
evidence of its machinations from its opposition and the public at
large, and then depend on the reviewing courts to uphold the legis-
lation under a minimal standard of review. To prevent such
abuses, the court, when dealing with wealthy and powerful indus-
tries that provide essential services or products to a politically
weak clientele, should heighten its scrutiny of the means and the
end of the law in question.
The court should look closely at the relationship of the par-
ties. For example, though some argue that medically injured pa-
tients are sufficiently represented by the legislators who passed the
law because those legislators are also potentially affected by that
197. See note 176 and accompanying text supra.
198. Nowak, supra note 54, at 1096.
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law, if one considers the nature of the problem and the political
context in which its resolution takes place, the illusion of adequate
representation precluding judicial review vanishes. A healthy per-
son ordinarily does not consider the possibility that he or she
might become the victim of medical malpractice; a legislator suc-
cumbing to political pressure from the medical and insurance in-
dustries might not identify with those whose rights he signs away.
The doctor's power over the patient is increased by his threats to
discontinue practice if malpractice premiums are not reduced, and
by the godlike status society confers upon him. Until that patient
or that legislator suffers injury at the hands of a doctor and seeks
redress, he or she is unlikely to understand the ramifications of the
law.
Nor should the court be deceived by the apparently great ef-
fort the legislature made to study the malpractice problem. Al-
though the California legislature began studying the "crisis" in the
Fall of 1972, in hearings before an Assembly Select Committee, by
February of 1975, three years later, the Committee had not
obtained financial data from the insurance companies that would
support the existence of a crisis.
One could argue that liberty comprehends freedom from dis-
ease and that each individual, therefore, has a fundamental right
to medical care. And even if a court does not wish to declare a new
fundamental right, an informed court would have to see the injus-
tice of allowing the legislature, under the influence of doctors and
insurance companies, to isolate patients and destroy their rights.
The court should contemplate the relationship of the parties and
consider the words of Professor Ely:
[I]n every legislative balance one of the competing interests loses
to some extent; indeed usually... they both do. On some occa-
sions the Constitution throws its weight on the side of one of
them, indicatig the balance must be restruck. And on others...
it is at least arguable that, constitutional directive or not, the
Court should throw its weight on the side of a minority demand-
ing in court more than it was able to achieve politically....
[This suggestion] should be reserved for those interests which, as
compared with the interests to which they have been subordi-
nated, constitute minorities unusually incapable of protecting
themselves.1 99
Clearly this legislation requires more than minimal review if
justice is to be done. If the state supreme courts fail to consider
199. Ely, The Wages of Crying Wolf: A Comment on Roe v. Wade, 82 YAuE L.J., 920,
934 (1973).
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the context in which medical malpractice legislation developed and
scrutinize it accordingly, then the United States Supreme Court
should grant certiorari at the next opportunity and examine these
laws and their purported basis, using Professor Nowak's demon-
strable basis standard.
